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ABSTRACT
In this demo, we provide an overview of themacOS Bluetooth stack
internals and gain access to undocumented low-level interfaces. We
leverage this knowledge to add macOS support to the InternalBlue
firmware modification and wireless experimentation framework.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The macOS Bluetooth stack is an interesting research target, since
all iMacs and MacBooks exclusively use Broadcom Bluetooth chips.
These chips allow unsigned temporary firmware patches via Inter-
nalBlue [6]. Integrating macOS into InternalBlue enables full access
to the Bluetooth chips in hundreds of millions of devices.
Officially, Bluetooth access on macOS is supported by the Cor
eBluetooth and IOBluetooth frameworks. However, these frame-
works are very restricted. Firmware modification requires access
to the Host Controller Interface (HCI), and sending arbitrary data
over-the-air requires Asynchronous Connection-Less (ACL) injec-
tion. We reverse-engineer themacOS Bluetooth stack to understand
HCI and ACL in Section 2. Based on the reverse-engineering results,
we develop custom hooks that could also be extended for other
applications in Section 3. We conclude the results of the macOS
IntenalBlue integration in Section 4.
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2 BLUETOOTH STACK OVERVIEW
An overview of the macOS Bluetooth stack is shown in Figure 1.
User-space applications do not interact directly with the chip, mac-
OS restricts communication to the IOBluetoothFamily.kext dri-
ver, running in kernel-space. The officialmacOS Bluetooth API does
not allow sending HCI, ACL, or Synchronous Connection-Oriented
(SCO) packets. However, CoreBluetooth and selected publicly doc-
umented classes and functions of IOBluetooth offer application
developers high-level access to a few very basic functions, i.e., re-
trieving the Bluetooth address [2, 3]. Playing music via Bluetooth
headphones is abstracted further, as the application developer only
needs to be aware of music playback but not the specific output
method. Thus, audio functions can be accessed via AVAudioPlayer,
and then,macOS decides if the music is sent to the internal speakers
or an external Bluetooth peripheral depending on the audio settings
selected by the user. In case Bluetooth headphones are connected
and selected, the music is forwarded to bluetoothaudiod. Since it
is a separate daemon, it forwards the audio again to bluetoothd
via Cross-Process Communication (XPC).
Nonetheless, the various Bluetooth frameworks need to access
functions within IOBluetooth, specifically BluetoothHCISendRaw
Command for sending HCI commands to the Bluetooth chip and Blue
toothHCISendRawACLData for transmitting ACL data. CoreBlue
tooth only accesses these functions indirectly via bluetoothd,
which in turn accesses IOBluetooth.
Note that the function to send HCI commands was reverse-
engineered and documented before [1]. However, the existing project
only supported selected commands documented in the Bluetooth
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Figure 1: Apple’s macOS Bluetooth stack.
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int BluetoothHCISendRawCommand(uint32_t request , void *commandData , size_t commmandSize);
int BluetoothHCISendRawACLData(void *commandData , size_t commandSize , uint32_t handle , uint32_t request);
Listing 1: Reverse-engineered function names.
Apr 22 23:40:49:668 Error ACLPacketToHw No Device Handle 0x172
Apr 22 23:40:49:668 LEAS Send 0x0172 ▶ Data [Handle: 0x0172, Packet Boundary Flags: 0x3, Length: 0x0010 (16)]
Apr 22 23:40:49:668 Error Above ACL Packet not sent Handle 0x172
(a) ACL with wrong function parameters.
Apr 22 23:44:30.514 LEAS Send 0x000B ▶ Data [Handle: 0x000B, Packet Boundary Flags: 0x3, Length: 0x0010 (16)]
Apr 22 23:44:31.006 HCI Event 0x000B ▶ Number of Completed Packets - Handle: 0x000B - Packets: 0x0001
(b) Successful ACL transmission.
Figure 2: ACL method calls captured with PacketLogger.
specification and had no external interface, while InternalBlue sup-
port requires vendor-specific commands. Moreover, we are the first
to reverse-engineer ACL on macOS.
HCI and ACL are slightly different in their functionality. For
example, HCI supports configuring the Bluetooth chip. Most HCI
commands are not connection-related. In contrast, ACL is used
for data transmission within an active connection and, thus, al-
ways requires a connection handle. However, communication with
the Bluetooth chip’s interface is very similar for both of them.
Thus, both use the more generic private BluetoothHCIDispatch
UserClientRoutine, which passes them to the IOKit user-space
framework [4]. The corresponding function is called IOConnect
CallStructMethod and finally forwards the Bluetooth packet to
the IOBluetoothFamily kernel-space driver using a Mach port.
This driver supports various means of transportation to the chip:
USB, UART, and PCIe.
The HCI and ACL methods within IOBluetooth are not callable
by external binaries because they are not declared in the IOBlue
tooth headers. By declaring them in a header file of an Objective-C
project and importing the framework, they become callable. While
we chose the methods within IOBluetooth to support InternalBlue
onmacOS, it would also be possible to instead hook into and import
IOKit and use the IOConnectCallStructMethod, which is even
deeper in the stack. With this declaration, any user on macOS is
able to execute a binary that calls these functions—no privileged
access is required to modify the firmware on the Bluetooth chip.
An alternate approach is to communicate with bluetoothd via
XPC [7]. However, our approach bypasses bluetoothd and directly
communicates with the chip—no capability checks on the calling
process are performed.
Overall, bluetoothd has more of an administrative role on ma-
cOS. In contrast, bluetoothd on iOS is located much deeper within
the stack [5].
3 REVERSE-ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES
We used various reverse-engineering tools and debugging methods
to analyze the macOS Bluetooth stack.
Initially, we analyzedmacOS binaries usingHopper v4 andGhidra.
Most of these binaries were not stripped and still contained most
function names, enabling full-text searches for ‘ACL’ and ‘HCI’. As
bluetoothd excessively calls the private IOBluetooth framework,
this provided us with many insights.
When accessing functions like BluetoothHCISendRawCommand
within a project, they need to be declared in an Objective-C header
file and IOBluetooth has to be imported. By importing the frame-
work, the binary is linked against it—which also includes undocu-
mentedmethods. However, to call functionswithin the IOBluetooth
framework, not only their names but also their precise arguments
and types are required. There are two methods to reverse-engineer
these. The most commonly known is runtime analysis with a debug-
ger like lldb. However, we chose another option. Apple provides a
Bluetooth PacketLogger in their Additional Tools for Xcode.
By trying different data types and values for the arguments
of BluetoothHCISendRawCommand and BluetoothHCISendRawACL
Data and simultaneously checking the logs in PacketLogger, we
were able to determine the purposes and data types of each variable
and reconstructed the function signatures. As shown in Listing 1,
both functions have parameters for a request identifier, the data to
be transmitted, and the total command size in bytes. ACL connec-
tions are always end-to-end with another device, which is identified
by a handle to support multiple ACL connections in parallel. Thus,
the ACL function requires an additional handle parameter.
When guessing the correct function signatures, PacketLogger
provides immediate feedback as shown in Figure 2. For example,
we initially swapped the handle and request identifier. Thus, Pack-
etLogger complains that there is no connection with the handle
0x0172. After swapping these parameters, ACL data can be trans-
mitted successfully.
4 CONCLUSION
We tested the resultingmacOS InternalBlue port on a high variety of
devices, including a recent MacBook Pro 16” Late 2019 on Catalina,
going back to an iMac Late 2009 on High Sierra. Thus, even though
the IOBluetooth framework is undocumented, HCI and ACL ac-
cess stay the same across various macOS versions. Moreover, using
IOBluetooth operates independently from the underlying trans-
port mode, which can be USB, UART, or PCIe. With the approach
described in this demo, InternalBlueworks on all these chip variants.
This enables Bluetooth security research on various devices.
InternalBlue on macOS WiSec ’20, July 8–10, 2020, Linz (Virtual Event), Austria
DEMO SETUP
Our demonstration will consist of two parts: (1) a minimal working
example to hook IOBluetooth functions on macOS, as well as (2)
a video recording of the full InternalBlue integration.
The minimal working example requires access to a macOS com-
puter runningMojave or Catalina and Xcode. This example provides
the user with a command-line application that demonstrates how
to call private IOBluetooth functions. In contrast, while the Inter-
nalBlue integration uses the same mechanism, is way more complex
and harder to understand. The code of this example is openly avail-
able and we provide detailed installation and usage instructions.
Since not everyone has access to a macOS device or the time
to compile a project in Xcode, we will also upload videos of the
minimal working example and the full InternalBlue integration.
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